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Abstract 
Evidence-based reasoning is at the core of many problem-
solving and decision-making tasks in a wide variety of 
domains. Generalizing from the research and development of 
cognitive agents in several such domains, this paper presents 
progress toward a computational theory for the development 
of instructable cognitive agents for evidence-based reasoning 
tasks. The paper also illustrates the application of this theory 
to the development of four prototype cognitive agents in 
domains that are critical   to the government and the public 
sector. Two agents function as cognitive assistants, one in 
intelligence analysis, and the other in science education. The 
other two agents operate autonomously, one in cybersecurity 
and the other in intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance. The paper concludes with the directions of 
future research on the proposed computational theory. 
Introduction 
Evidence is any observable sign, datum, or item of 
information that is relevant in deciding whether a statement 
or hypothesis under consideration is true or false.  
 English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, over two centuries 
ago, once famously said, “The field of evidence is no other 
than the field of knowledge” (Bentham, 1810). Indeed, 
evidence-based reasoning (EBR) is at the core of many 
problem-solving and decision-making tasks in a wide 
variety of domains, including cybersecurity, intelligence 
analysis, forensics, medicine, law, history, archaeology, and 
all the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.).  
 However, evidence-based reasoning has been studied in 
each of these domains in isolation from the others. Only 
recently steps have been taken to study evidence as a 
multidisciplinary subject (Twinning, 2003), and to lay the 
foundation for a Science of Evidence (Schum, 2009). 
 Generalizing from our research and development of 
cognitive agents in several domains, we are making progress 
toward formulating a computational theory supporting the 
development of instructable cognitive agents for evidence-
based reasoning tasks. Currently this theory includes:  
• A systematic approach to evidence-based reasoning 
consisting of collaborative computational processes of 
evidence in search of hypotheses or questions in search 
of answers, hypotheses in search of evidence, and 
evidentiary testing of hypotheses. 
• A general ontology of evidence and associated 
computational methods for assessing the credibility of 
different types of evidence. 
• The architecture for an instructable cognitive agent 
shell that incorporates this general evidence-based 
reasoning knowledge, can be taught reasoning 
strategies, and can function either interactively, as an 
assistant to a human user, or autonomously.  
This paper presents these aspects of the theory and their 
application to the development of four prototype cognitive 
agents in domains that are critical to the government and the 
public sector. Two of the agents function as cognitive 
assistants, one in intelligence analysis, and the other in 
science education. The other two agents operate 
autonomously, one in cybersecurity and the other in 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  
Evidence-Based Reasoning as Discovery of 
Evidence, Hypotheses, and Arguments 
Developed in the framework of the scientific method, the 
computational approach to evidence-based reasoning views 
this process as ceaseless discovery of evidence, hypotheses, 
and arguments in a non-stationary world, involving 
collaborative computational processes of evidence in search 
of hypotheses, hypotheses in search of evidence, and 
evidentiary testing of hypotheses  (see Figure 1).   
 First, through abductive (imaginative) reasoning that 
shows that something is possibly true, one generates 
alternative hypotheses that may explain an observation of 
interest or answer an important question. Next, through 
deductive reasoning that shows that something is 
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necessarily true, one uses these hypotheses to generate new 
lines of inquiry and discover new evidence for testing them. 
After that, through inductive reasoning that shows that 
something is probably true, one tests the hypotheses by 
developing argumentation structures that show how the 
discovered evidence favors or disfavors them. 
 Evidence in search of hypotheses, hypotheses in search of 
evidence, and evidentiary testing of hypotheses are 
collaborative processes that support each other in recursive 
calls, as shown in the bottom part of Figure 1. For example, 
the discovery of new evidence may lead to the modification 
of the existing hypotheses or the generation of new ones 
that, in turn, lead to the search and discovery of new 
evidence. Also, inconclusive testing of the hypotheses leads 
to the need of discovering additional evidence. 
 In the following we discuss several general methods for 
performing each of these processes, either by a person in 
collaboration with a cognitive assistant, or by an 
autonomous agent. 
Evidence in Search of Hypotheses 
The EBR process is usually triggered by an interesting 
observation that needs to be explained. The question is: 
What hypotheses would explain this observation?  
Answering this question is challenging both for humans and 
for automated agents because it involves abductive 
(imaginative) reasoning. Automatic hypothesis generation 
through abductive reasoning is computationally-intensive 
because there are numerous hypotheses that can be abduced 
from an observation. Eco (1983) distinguishes between four 
types of abduction based on their level of creativity (see the 
left-hand side of Table 1). In overcoded abduction we have 
evidence that event E occurred and prior knowledge “HE” 
from which we infer that H is possible. In undercoded 
abduction our prior knowledge includes multiple rules 
(H1E, H2E, … HnE) and we decide to select the 
antecedent of one as our hypothesis. In creative abduction 
we have no relevant prior knowledge but we have a “hunch” 
that H might be true. Finally, in meta-abduction, we have a 
sequence of abduction steps, from E to F, from F to G, and 
from G to H, and we decide to act on H without having a 
chance to verify each stage of reasoning.  
 Thagard (1993) identified four other types of abduction, 
based on what is being abduced (see the top part of Table 1). 
In simple abduction we try to explain why some entity, 
object, or person X has an interesting characteristic or 
behavior G, and we make the hypothesis that X is an H 
because all entities in H have G. In existential abduction, we 
hypothesize the existence of some previously unobserved 
entity which is in a certain relation R with the entity having 
the characteristic or behavior G to be explained, because the 
existence of R explains G. In analogical abduction, we have 
already generated some initial hypothesis H. But in the past 
when H was true, K was also true. Therefore, we can refine 
our hypothesis to H & K. Finally, in rule-forming abduction, 
we hypothesize a rule that allows us to explain why the 
entity X has that interesting characteristic or behavior G. 
 Schum, (2001a) showed that the types of abductions 
identified by Eco and Thagard are, in fact, orthogonal since 
we can identify all the possible 16 combinations of 
abductions, based on their creativity and form (i.e., simple 
overcoded abduction through rule-forming meta abduction), 
as shown in Table 1. While some of these abductions require 
human imaginative reasoning (e.g., simple creative 
abduction), those combining Thagard’s simple, existential, 
and analogical abduction, with Eco’s overcoded and 
undercoded abduction can be automatically performed (e.g., 
analogical undercoded abduction). 
 We are investigating a more efficient approach to 
hypothesis generation as a multi-step abductive process 
where each abductive step involving the generation of 
competing hypotheses is followed by evidence collection 
and testing of these hypotheses, to significantly prune the 
hypothesis space. The envisioned approach is illustrated in 
Figure 2. If we were to perform a single-step abduction, 
from evidence E to a hypothesis that would explain it, we 
would obtain a huge number of hypotheses represented as 
dots at the top of the figure. We would then need to 
investigate each of these competing hypotheses to find the 
most likely explanation. 
 Now consider performing multi-step abduction. From E 
one can abduce F, Fi, and Fj. At this point, we would search 
for evidence relevant to these three hypotheses and we 
 
Figure 1: The evidence-based reasoning processes. 
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would test them based on the discovered evidence, as 
illustrated in Figure 1, concluding, for example, that F is the 
most promising. Then we would continue the abduction 
from F, abducing G, Gm, and Gn, testing these hypotheses, 
and concluding, for example, that G is the most promising. 
Finally, from G, we would abduce H, Hp, and Hg, and test 
them. Such an approach based on spiral hybrid reasoning, 
where small abductive, deductive, and inductive steps feed 
off of each other, has the potential of significantly pruning 
the hypothesis space to tractable levels.  
Hypotheses in Search of Evidence  
To discover new evidence, the agent puts each of the 
generated hypothesis to work, guiding the collection of 
relevant evidence. One approach is to ask the question: What 
evidence would be observable if this hypothesis were true? 
One decomposes the hypothesis into simpler and simpler 
hypotheses, and uses the simplest hypotheses to generate 
new lines of inquiry and discover new evidence. The 
reasoning might go as follows: 
If Hk were true then the sub-
hypotheses Hk1, Hk2, and Hk3 
would also need to be true. But 
if Hk2 were true then one 
would need to observe 
evidence Ek2, and so on (see 
the middle side of Figure 1 and 
Figure 3). This process leads 
to the discovery of new 
evidence by identifying the 
necessary conditions for 
hypothesis Hk.  
A broader question that 
guides the discovery of 
evidence is: What evidence would favor or disfavor this 
hypothesis? In this case one would look for sufficient 
conditions, or even indicators, for a hypothesis to be true or 
false. As we discuss next, this hypothesis decomposition 
process leads to the development of a Wigmorean 
probabilistic inference network for testing the hypothesis.  
Evidentiary Testing of Hypotheses  
Hypothesis testing is probabilistic in nature because the 
evidence is always incomplete no matter how much we have 
and is commonly inconclusive in the sense that it is 
consistent with the truth of more than one hypothesis. 
Further, the evidence is frequently ambiguous, with multiple 
meanings. A mass of evidence is in most situations 
dissonant, some favoring and some disfavoring the 
hypothesis under consideration. Finally, the evidence comes 
from sources with different levels of credibility. 
 However, none of the non-enumerative probability views 
known to us (Subjective Bayes, Belief Functions, Fuzzy, 
and Baconian) can optimally cope with all these five 
characteristics of evidence (Schum, 2001b; Tecuci et al., 
2016a). For example, both the Subjective Bayesian view and 
the Baconian view have difficulties with ambiguities or 
imprecision in evidence. On the other hand, the Fuzzy view 
and the Belief Functions view can naturally cope with such 
imprecisions. The Baconian view is the only one that can 
optimally deal with the incompleteness of evidence. The 
Subjective Bayesian, Belief Functions, and Fuzzy views all 
answer the question: How strong is the evidence we do have 
about this hypothesis? It is thus possible to encounter 
situations where, based on the current evidence, all these 
three views predict that H3 is the most likely hypothesis, just 
to learn later that H1 was the one that was true. The Baconian 
view would have helped with this situation because it 
answers the question: How much evidence do we have about 
this hypothesis, and how many questions about it remain 
unanswered? Thus, it would have helped to acknowledge 
that the answers to these unanswered questions may not 
favor H3. Therefore, when testing a hypothesis, one should 
assess not only the probability of being true, but also the 
confidence in this probability. 
 The conclusion of the above discussion is that one should 
employ hypothesis testing methods that integrate different 
probability views, to take advantage of their complementary 
capabilities and cope with all the five characteristics of 
evidence. We have developed such a method that integrates 
logic and Baconian probabilities with Fuzzy qualifiers, and 
uses the min/max probability combination rules common to 
the Baconian and Fuzzy views of probability. That is, the 
probability of a conjunction of hypotheses is the minimum 
of their probabilities, and the probability of a disjunction of 
hypotheses is the maximum of their probabilities. In this 
method, hypotheses are tested by developing Wigmorean 
probabilistic inference networks like the one in Figure 4.  
 Hypothesis H is decomposed into simpler hypotheses by 
considering both favoring arguments (supporting the truth 
of H), under the left (green) square, and disfavoring 
arguments (supporting the falsehood of H), under the right 
(pink) square. Each argument is an independent strategy of 
showing that H is true or false, and is characterized by a 
specific relevance or strength. The argument consists either 
of a single hypothesis (e.g., H3) or a conjunction of 
hypotheses (e.g., H1 & H2). The hypotheses from these 
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arguments are further decomposed through other arguments, 
leading to simpler and simpler hypotheses that can be more 
accurately assessed based on evidence. 
 Consider, for example, hypothesis H2a from the bottom 
of Figure 4. It has two items of favoring evidence, E1 and 
E2, and one item of disfavoring evidence, E3. For each item, 
one assesses its credibility and its relevance to the 
hypothesis H2a. Then the inferential force of each item of 
evidence is computed as the minimum between its 
credibility and its relevance. The probability of hypothesis 
H2a is determined by balancing the combined inferential 
force of the favoring evidence (which is the maximum 
between the inferential force of E1 and that of E2), and the 
inferential force of the disfavoring evidence E3. 
 The probabilities of the upper-level hypotheses are 
computed in a similar way, based on the 
probabilities of their sub-hypotheses, leading to an 
assessment of the top level hypothesis H. 
General EBR Knowledge 
An evidence-based reasoning agent needs a 
significant amount of knowledge in order to 
perform the processes illustrated in Figure 1. Part 
of it, however, is general evidence-based reasoning 
knowledge that is defined once and can be used by 
any agent, as discussed below.  
Ontology of Evidence 
Figure 5 shows a fragment of a general ontology of 
evidence (Schum et al., 2009). Tangible evidence is 
evidence that can be directly examined to see what 
events it might reveal. Real tangible evidence is the 
thing itself, while demonstrative tangible evidence is a 
representation or illustration of a thing (e.g., a diagram, map, 
sensor image, or record of some sort). Testimonial evidence 
is evidence about some event provided by a human source. 
It can be based on direct observation, second hand report 
from another source, or on the basis of opinion or inferences 
based on information about the occurrence of other events. 
An authoritative record is evidence accepted to be true, such 
as a tide table, celestial table, or table of physical or 
mathematical results. Finally, missing evidence is evidence 
that is expected to exist but is not found. 
Credibility Assessment Patterns 
For each evidence type in the ontology from Figure 5 there 
is a general, domain-independent pattern for assessing its 
credibility. For illustration, let us consider a person S 
reporting the observation of an event that supports the 
truthfulness of hypothesis H. The evidence E provided by S 
is an example of unequivocal testimonial evidence based 
upon direct observation (see bottom-left of Figure 5). The 
credibility of E depends on the credibility of the source S 
that, in turn, depends on the source’s competence, veracity, 
and accuracy, as shown in the top part of Figure 6. Each of 
these credibility indicators depends on lower level 
indicators.  For example, the veracity of the source depends 
on the truthfulness of the information provided by the source 
and on the trustworthiness of the source. The truthfulness of 
the information provided by the source depends on 
corroborative evidence (Is there any other evidence that 
corroborates or confirms this source's report?) and on 
contradictory evidence (Is there any existing evidence that 
contradicts or conflicts with what the source has reported?). 
 The trustworthiness of the source depends on source’s 
character (What evidence do we have about this source's 
character and honesty?), reliability (What does the record 
 
Figure 4: Wigmorean probabilistic inference network. 
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Figure 5: Fragment of the ontology of evidence. 
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show about the truthfulness of this source's previous 
reports?), goals (Does what this source tells us support any 
of his or her goals?), and other indicators, as shown at the 
bottom right of Figure 6 (Tecuci et al., 2016a). 
 The probabilities of the lowest-level indicators in Figure 
6 are assessed based on evidence. Then these probabilities 
are composed, from bottom up, to obtain the probabilities of 
the upper level indicators and, ultimately, the probability 
that evidence E is true (i.e., the credibility of E).  
 In a given situation, however, we may not have evidence 
to evaluate each indicator. The pattern in Figure 6 shows, 
for each indicator, the relevance of each possible 
combination of the present sub-indicators. For example, the 
relevance of a source’s competence, veracity, and accuracy 
taken together, on the source’s credibility is certain (C). 
However, the relevance of source’s competence and 
veracity is only likely (L), and the relevance of veracity 
alone is barely likely (BL). This explains the contradictions 
in the evidence on the same event, provided by the two main 
witnesses in the Senate confirmation hearings of Judge 
Kavanagh for the Supreme Court, where each of these 
witnesses were assessed as having high veracity. As one can 
see, when assessing the credibility of testimonial evidence, 
there is much more to consider than veracity. The * operator 
in Figure 6, called combined indicator, computes the 
probability of a hypothesis based on the presence and 
probability of its indicators, and corresponds to the 
disjunction of all possible conjunctions of these indicators.  
Instructable Cognitive Agent Shell 
The computational theory of evidence-based reasoning 
described in the previous section has led to the design and 
development of the general instructable agent shell shown 
in Figure 7.  The shell employs a hybrid knowledge 
representation consisting of an ontology and various types 
of rules, including the general knowledge discussed in the 
previous section. The shell has two main components, a 
Mixed-Initiative Learning and Reasoning Assistant and an 
Autonomous Multi-Agent Reasoner. 
A subject matter expert directly teaches the Mixed-
Initiative Learning and Reasoning Assistant how to 
investigate a specific alert by following the systematic 
process illustrated in Figure 1. During this process the expert 
explains each step involved in the investigation to the agent, 
from generating the hypotheses that may explain that alert, 
to using each of these hypotheses in guiding the collection 
of additional evidence, and to testing the hypotheses based 
on the collected evidence. Through the employment of the 
Disciple-EBR multistrategy learning approach, which 
integrates learning from examples, learning from 
explanations, and learning by analogy and experimentation, 
in a mixed-initiative interaction with the expert, the assistant 
learns general rules to generate hypotheses, rules to search 
for and monitor evidence, and rules to test the hypotheses. 
Successive versions of this learning approach are presented 
in (Tecuci 1998; Tecuci et al. 2005; 2008; 2016b; Boicu et 
al., 2011). 
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The result of teaching the agent is a Reference 
Knowledge Base that enables the Autonomous Multi-Agent 
Reasoner to perform evidence-based reasoning. The agents 
of the Autonomous Multi-Agent Reasoner are copies of the 
corresponding modules of the Mixed-Initiative Learning 
and Reasoning Assistant except that they are configured to 
run autonomously and communicate by developing and 
exchanging the Knowledge Bases shown in the left hand 
side of the Figure 7. Notice that the architecture may include 
multiple copies of an agent (e.g., the Hypothesis Analysis 
Agent) to speed-up the analysis process. Connection to the 
application environment is done through the Surveillance 
Manager and the Collection and Monitoring Manager.  
Evidence-Based Reasoning Agents 
The presented computational theory and agent shell 
architecture emerged from our experience in developing 
several agents for evidence-based reasoning. In the 
following we overview four of these agents developed for 
domains that are critical to the government and the public 
sector, highlighting the specific challenges addressed by 
each. Features of these agents that are of particular interest 
to the government are: transparency, explanations and, 
trust, by making explicit their reasoning as Wigmorean 
probabilistic inference networks with symbolic probabilities 
that are easy to understand, and by their ability to self-
analyze their reasoning, highlighting potential biases and 
weaknesses; control, through a mixed-initiative interaction 
allowing the user to decide the agent’s level of autonomy, 
from fully automatic, to human “on the loop,” to human “in 
the loop,” and to complete user control; and adaptability, 
through continuous learning and refinement from domain 
experts, without requiring software development.  
Cogent: Cognitive Assistant for Intelligence 
Analysts 
Intelligence analysts face the astonishingly complex task of 
drawing defensible and persuasive conclusions from masses 
of evidence of all types, in a world that is changing all the 
time. A prediction just made may be overtaken by 
subsequent events. Such predictions are often of immediate 
interest, without time for extensive research and deliberation 
on the available evidence which, moreover, is always 
incomplete, commonly inconclusive, frequently ambiguous, 
dissonant in most situations, and from sources with various 
levels of credibility. These evidence characteristics make 
the predictions, not only probabilistic in nature, but also 
prone to errors, because none of the probability systems 
(e.g., Subjective Bayesian, Belief Functions, Baconian, 
Fuzzy) can individually cope with all these five 
characteristics of evidence. Additional errors are introduced 
by the analyst’s biases. 
 To address these challenges, we developed Cogent as an 
assistant for intelligence analysts, with the goal of enabling 
a synergistic integration of the analyst’s imagination and 
expertise with the computer’s knowledge and critical 
reasoning (Tecuci et al., 2015; 2018). Consider again the 
process described in Figure 1. While the analyst has to 
imagine the possible answers to the intelligence question 
asked, Cogent helps with producing a schematic diagram 
that completely lays out the underlying analytic framework 
for every analytic conclusion, including the connection 
between the evidence and various intermediate conclusions 
in the analysis, the evaluation of the credibility of evidence 
and its strength in supporting a conclusion, and the role of 
any assumptions in addressing missing information. Cogent 
can also detect several biases, such as confirmation bias 
(building an argumentation and only search for evidence 
that confirms analyst’s beliefs while dismissing or ignoring 
evidence to the contrary), satisficing bias (choosing the first 
hypothesis that appears good enough, rather than carefully 
identifying all possible hypotheses and determining which 
one is the most consistent with the evidence), and potential 
absence of evidence bias (failure to consider the degree of 
completeness of the available evidence). Many other biases 
are avoided because explicit argumentations are developed 
and Cogent employs an intuitive system of symbolic 
probabilities. Additionally, Cogent facilitates the analysis of 
what-if scenarios, where the analyst may make various 
assumptions and Cogent automatically determines their 
influence on the analytic conclusion. It also automatically 
updates the analysis based on new or revised evidence. Once 
the analysis is finalized, Cogent generates a structured 
report that the analyst then transforms into a more 
understandable and persuasive production report. The final 
report, which includes argumentation fragments and 
evidence, can be shared with other users, subjected to 
critical analysis, and correspondingly improved.  
Cogent and associated training lectures are accessible at 
http://lac.gmu.edu/cogent/  
 
Figure 7: Architecture of the learning agent shell. 
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sInvestigator: Science Investigator 
Inquiry-based teaching in schools at all levels is recognized 
as being effective, but difficult to use in practice. The effort 
required to design inquiry-based lessons is greater than for 
content-based lessons because the teacher needs to both 
introduce the topics and to guide their discovery by the 
students. Even when inquiry-based lessons are already 
available, their adaptation to the knowledge and skill level 
of the students is challenging. Also challenging is the 
evaluation of the quality and effectiveness of inquiry 
because direct student comparisons are not usually possible. 
 sInvestigator is a cognitive assistant that was developed 
to help science teachers in conducting inquiry-based classes 
that help students develop critical thinking skills in 
addressing scientific problems. It has built-in features to 
engage the students in understanding, extending, creating, 
critiquing, and debating evidence-based scientific 
argumentations in real-life scientific investigations. For 
example, the instructor formulates an inquiry and the 
students imagine its possible answers. Then they search 
evidence on the Internet and develop argumentations for the 
competing answers to determine the most likely one.  
 We have experimentally used sInvestigator in HNRS 353 
Modern Scientific Revolutions, HNRS 240 History of 
Science, and HNRS 353 Science of Cities, all George Mason 
University undergraduate science classes for non-science 
majors. Examples of inquiries investigated in these classes 
include: Has life changed over time? What is the mechanism 
by which life changes over time? How will fully 
autonomous vehicles make road transportation safer?  What 
energy source is appropriate for San Francisco?  
 sInvestigator was particularly helpful in assisting students 
in performing deep credibility analyses of scientific 
evidence obtained from the Internet, by employing the 
pattern shown in Figure 8 which is a simplification and 
adaptation of the general credibility pattern from Figure 6. 
The agent is accessible at http://lac.gmu.edu/sInvestigator/ 
CAPIP: Cognitive Agent for Persistent 
Intelligence Processing 
Hypothesis generation and analysis in intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is not currently 
automated, which is a significant limitation for the ISR 
systems that continuously produce huge amounts of 
information in need of immediate processing. CAPIP is an 
initial prototype system designed for automatic ISR (Tecuci 
et al., 2019). It watches for alerts among the events provided 
by the MITRE’s Integrated Environment for Persistent 
Intelligence software. An alert is an indicator of one or 
several hypotheses of interest, such as the notification that 
tracking of Ship1 by the Automatic Identification System 
was lost at Time1 near Location1. Possible explanatory 
hypotheses include: “Ship1 performs covert goods transfer”, 
“Ship1 performs illegal fishing operations”, and “Ship1 
avoids tracking by pirates.” CAPIP follows the EBR process 
from Figure 1 to generate alternative explanations of the 
alert and determine the most likely hypothesis. 
CAAPT: Cognitive Agents for Advanced 
Persistent Threats 
Modern cyber defense is done in a cybersecurity operations 
center (CSOC) where analysts monitor alerts and log data 
from available information sources and use them to make  
determinations about the presence or absence of intrusion 
activity (Zimmerman, 2014). However, the large and 
increasing number of alerts and the time required for their 
manual analysis creates a very complex and expensive 
security environment for network defense organizations that 
are faced with a shortage of cybersecurity analysts and an 
ever increasing analyst cost. Among the biggest security 
challenges are those from the Advanced Persistent Threats 
(APTs), computer network exploitation groups (many of 
them state-sponsored) that leverage superior resources, 
knowledge, and tactics to gain and maintain access to 
targeted networks and adapt to defenders’ efforts to resist 
them. Current automatic security systems do not reliably 
detect APTs because this requires reasoning over a large set 
of weak indicators. Therefore, the detection is manually 
done by experienced cyber analysts. 
In an attempt to address these problems, we have 
developed CAAPT with the architecture shown in Figure 7 
(Meckl et al., 2017). The Mixed-Initiative Learning and 
Reasoning Assistant is instructed by a cybersecurity expert 
how to investigate cybersecurity alerts. The resulting 
Reference Knowledge Base enables the Autonomous Multi-
Agent System to investigate alerts, as the cyber expert 
would, but in a transparent manner that allows a natural “on 
the loop” supervision by a cyber operator. At the same time, 
CAAPT can also operate interactively, with the “user in the 
loop,” as a trusted collaborator of the human analyst. 
 We have designed and performed experiments to test both 
the training of CAAPT and its ability to detect configuration 
changes in the same malware and new malware versions as 
the attackers’ tool set evolved over time. The experiment 
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simulated a subset of the historical evolution of APT1 
malware: Auriga → Auriga variants → Bangat → Bangat 
variants → Seasalt → Seasalt variants → Kurton → Kurton 
variants (Mandiant, 2013). Attack models were tested in 
isolated virtual machines by simulating APT1 malware 
infections and running CAAPT against them. After being 
trained to detect a specific malware (e.g., Auriga), the agent 
was able to detect variants of that malware, and it required 
limited incremental training to detect other members of the 
family of that malware. Additionally, CAAPT rapidly 
detected APT1 intrusions through a rigorous and transparent 
analysis, as judged by the training expert. 
Conclusions 
Generalizing from the research and development of 
instructable cognitive agents for evidence-based reasoning 
in several domains, this paper presented progress toward a 
computational theory that will improve and accelerate the 
development of such agents. It presented a framework for 
evidence-based reasoning, a domain-independent ontology 
of evidence, a sample credibility analysis pattern, and the 
architecture of an instructable agent shell. Future research 
will extend and improve this computational theory and the 
component methods for evidence-based reasoning. It will 
also develop the agent shell and the presented agents, and 
investigate new agents in domains such as personal health 
monitoring and fraud detection in the financial services. 
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